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Much potential for trade liberalization exists in industries and markets with trade barriers 
that are prohibitive for all or many firms. In standard political economic theories of trade 
policy, observed prohibitive barriers must be globally optimal according to static government 
preferences, leaving no possibility for a trade agreement. This paper shows that for 
prohibitive policies in imperfectly competitive markets, a trade agreement can still play a role 
even without any changes in governments' policy preferences. Theory can then further 
identify market characteristics for which liberalization is most likely to be feasible.  
To illustrate the simplest case, we consider a two-country model with firms engaged in 
Cournot competition in segmented markets. For plausible ranges of political weights on firm 
profits, there is a role for a trade agreement in eliminating prohibitive trade barriers. We then 
consider how the potential for cooperation varies with trade costs and competition. 
Industries with more firm heterogeneity have greater potential for cooperation, provided that 
the lower productivity firms are sufficiently competitive. The implications of these results are 
discussed for negotiations involving either developing country exporters or services trade, 
two areas in which prohibitive trade barriers remain important. 
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A prohibitív vámok megszüntetésére irányuló 
együttműködés lehetőségei 
David R. DeRemer  
Összefoglaló 
 
Sok lehetőség nyílik a külkereskedelmi liberalizációra az olyan iparágakban és piacokon, 
amelyekben a külkereskedelemi korlátok prohibitívek az összes vagy sok vállalat számára. A 
külkereskedelmi politika sztenderd politikai gazdaságtani modelljeiben a megfigyelt 
prohibitív korlátozásoknak globálisan optimálisaknak kell lenniük statikus kormányzati 
preferenciák mellett, és ezért nincs lehetőség külkereskedelmi megállapodásra. Ez a 
tanulmány bemutatja, hogy tökéletlen verseny mellett viszont fontos szerepet játszhatnak a 
külkereskedelmi megállapodások a prohibitív korlátozások megszüntetésében még 
változatlan kormányzati preferenciák mellett is. Az elmélet alapján az is előre jelezhető, hogy 
milyen típusú piacokon lehetséges legnagyobb valószínűséggel a liberalizáció. A 
legegyszerűbb eset bemutatására egy kétországos modellt használunk, amelyben szegmentált 
piacokon Cournot-versenyt folytatnak egymással a vállalatok. Megmutatjuk, hogy sok olyan – 
a vállalati profit kormányzati célfüggvényben kapott súlyára vonatkozó – plauzibilis 
paraméterérték van, amelyek mellett ebben a keretben fontos szerepet játszhat a 
külkereskedelemi megállapodás. Ezután megvizsgáljuk, hogyan alakul az együttműködés 
lehetősége a szállítási költségek és a verseny erősségének függvényében. A nagyobb vállalati 
heterogenitással jellemezhető iparágakban több lehetőség van az együttműködésre, feltéve, 
hogy a legkevésbé termelékeny vállalatok is eléggé versenyképesek. Ezeknek az 
eredményeknek a jelentőségét két olyan területen érzékeltetjük, amelyeken fontos szerepet 
játszanak a prohibitív külkereskedelmi korlátozások: ezek a fejlődő országok exportja vagy a 
szolgáltatások külkereskedelmét érintő tárgyalások. 
 
JEL: F12, F13, F15 
 
Tárgyszavak: külkereskedelmi megállapodások, Cournot-verseny, a külkereskedelmi 
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Much potential for trade liberalization exists in industries and markets with trade
barriers that are prohibitive for all or many rms. In standard political economic the-
ories of trade policy, observed prohibitive barriers must be globally optimal according
to static government preferences, leaving no possibility for a trade agreement. This
paper shows that for prohibitive policies in imperfectly competitive markets, a trade
agreement can still play a role even without any changes in governmentspolicy prefer-
ences. Theory can then further identify market characteristics for which liberalization
is most likely to be feasible. To illustrate the simplest case, we consider a two-country
model with rms engaged in Cournot competition in segmented markets. For plausible
ranges of political weights on rm prots, there is a role for a trade agreement in elim-
inating prohibitive trade barriers. We then consider how the potential for cooperation
varies with trade costs and competition. Industries with more rm heterogeneity have
greater potential for cooperation, provided that the lower productivity rms are suf-
ciently competitive. The implications of these results are discussed for negotiations
involving either developing country exporters or services trade, two areas in which
prohibitive trade barriers remain important.
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization can be important for industries in countries for which little exporting
has previously existed. This is true for both the past and the present of trade negotiations.
In the era of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT), expanding market access
for developing countries with high barriers for trade was a signicant focus (Lamp, 2014),
and overall the experience of developing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
continues to be disappointing (Bagwell and Staiger, 2014). Another frontier of trade expan-
sion is in services trade. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has made
progress, but success has been limited relative to the GATT rounds in reducing manufactur-
ing barriers to trade (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). In services trade in particular, barriers
can take the form of domestic restrictions that limit market access (Crozet, Milet, and Mirza,
2013). Trade barriers in other sectors can also take a prohibitive form, e.g., local content
requirements in manufacturing like "Buy American" that crept up in the aftermath of the
2008 nancial crisis (Larch and Lechthaler, 2011) or regulation and standards that WTO
law considers to be unnecessarily discriminatory due to the lack of international recognition
or scientic justication (WTO, 2012).1
Despite the potential importance of such prohibitive trade barriers, much of the formal
research on the purpose of trade agreements focuses exclusively on cooperation over nonpro-
hibitive trade barriers. Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 2010) consider the prisoners dilemma
resulting when nations manipulate relative world prices, i.e. terms-of-trade manipulation,
in goods for which trade already exists.2 The theoretical underpinnings of the principle of
reciprocity rely on tari¤ reductions based on changes in prices when there is existing trade
volume (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002).3 Such theories of trade agreements explain
the great successes of the GATT thus far, but the computational evidence suggests that fu-
ture gains from reducing manufacturing tari¤s among developed countries are limited (Ossa,
2014). And one prominent survey of services trade argues that terms-of-trade manipulation
is of limited relevance in explaining the value of services trade agreements (Francois and
Hoekman, 2010). The potential importance of prohibitive trade barriers and the limited
focus of existing research in this area then motivate further exploration.
1Standards could also be nonprohibitive, resulting in an increased cost of compliance. Such policies are
always inferior to nonprohibitive trade taxes, all else equal, so we focus on trade taxes among nonprohibitive
policies in this paper. Nonetheless, larger exogenous costs to administering tari¤s could cause non-tari¤
barriers to be preferable.
2Much of the trade dispute literature (e.g. Maggi and Staiger, 2011) has focused on discrete barriers to
trade, though the microfoundations are not specied.
3Ossa (2011) considers a denition of reciprocity involving changes in manufacturing trade balance, but
from nonprohibitive levels.
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This paper proposes a theory of how governments would impose prohibitive trade barriers
noncooperatively but would still be willing to sign a cooperative agreement, even holding
xed the political motives that led to the prohibitive barriers in the rst place. The results
contrast with the existing theory that would argue that agreements over prohibitive barriers
cannot be achieved without changes in government preferences over policies.4 Aside from
the positive explanation of prohibitive policies, the theory can then help to identify market
characteristics for which trade cooperation is more likely to be feasible. To see why such
predictions are useful, consider an additional simple model of trade talks in which govern-
ments can pick a nite number of industries to discuss potential cooperation over removing
prohibitive policies, but the extent of the governmentsmotives to protect domestic prots
in each industry are unknown. For some industries, the preferences supporting protection
are so strong that any agreement is infeasible without changes in preferences, but for others,
governments can agree to move from noncooperative to cooperative policies if they use the
scarce resource of trade talks.5 There is then value in identifying for which industries the
trade talks could be e¤ective.
To develop a positive theory in which governments could form prohibitive trade barriers
unilaterally and then agree to eliminate those barriers, the following must be true:
1. The mutual elimination of the prohibitive trade barriers is preferable to the mainte-
nance of the trade barriers from the perspective of the negotiating governments, and
2. Prohibitive trade barriers must be unilaterally preferable to all possible nonprohibitive
trade barriers (including unilateral free trade).
Finding a trade model satisfying both of the preceding statements is a nontrivial exercise.
In the standard theory of trade agreements under perfect competition, there is no rst-order
e¤ect on global welfare from a reduction in trade barriers from prohibitive levels. As the
government preferences under consideration are typically globally concave, these prohibitive
4See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 2010) and Maggi (2014) for surveys of trade agreement models in
which government preferences over policy can be represented by a static utility function. In the standard
models, a change in government preferences would be necessary to achieve any reduction in trade barriers.
An alternative theory of trade agreements is that they allow governments to make commitments to avoid
pressure from domestic lobbies (e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007), so the trade agreement then allows
government to maintain preferences over policy that would not be feasible in the absence of the agreement.
5An additional reason why governments would fail to achieve cooperative policies is that the agreement
fails to be self-enforcing. Like much of the literature, this paper abstracts from the enforcement issue, though
several papers model the enforcement dimension explicitly (see e.g. Ch. 6 of Bagwell and Staiger, 2002).
Much of the literature also does not model explicitly how nations progress from cooperative to noncooperative
policies, though an exception is the gradualism literature (ibid.) For the current paper, the most relevant
model of cooperation is one where trade agreements are incomplete contracts and some contracting cost
must be paid to achieve the cooperative policy (Horn, Maggi, and Staiger, 2010).
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policies must then be globally optimal. Liberalization can then not be achieved unless the
government preferences change. The survey of Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2014) describes
this feature of prohibitive unilateral protection:
In this case of extreme [prohibitive] protection, and with its trade volume driven
to zero, the importing government does not enjoy a cost-shifting benet from the
reduction in world prices that its protection has caused (because it imports no
volume at these lower world prices), and so according to the terms-of-trade theory
this Nash tari¤ choice must in fact reect underlying features of the governments
preferences rather than ine¢ cient cost-shifting motives. And for this reason,
the terms-of-trade theory implies that autarkic Nash trade policy choices are
internationally e¢ cient, and as a consequence implies that there is nothing for a
trade agreement to accomplish in the presence of such choices.
The dearth of theory here may also be surprising considering that typical computational
exercises in trade policy will often nd that there are benets from reducing certain pro-
hibitive trade barriers. Typically the welfare evaluation is done from the perspective of the
standard national-income maximizing preferences rather than the policy preferences of the
negotiating governments.6 These exercises then tell us the value of liberalization, but they do
not tell us whether the agreements are politically feasible. Finding such feasible agreements
is the focus of the current paper.
This paper proposes a simple model that can rationalize both the unilateral imposition
of prohibitive trade barriers and cooperation from prohibitive trade barriers. We show that
in a set of models with competing Cournot rms in segmented markets, there is a rationale
for trade agreements removing prohibitive trade barriers. Prohibitive trade barriers prevent
rms from selling above marginal cost when exporting, so a unilateral prohibitive trade
barrier leads to a prot-shifting externality, the kind of imperfect competition externality
shown by Venables (1985) for various trade and domestic policies.7
The baseline model considers a single Cournot rm in each of two countries. Demand
is linear, so there is a choke point at which tari¤s can be prohibitive, and governments
maximize the standard national income plus an additional political economic weight on rm
prots. We rst consider the case in which marginal costs of production are equal across
6For an example, Ossa (2014) uses government preferences to calculate optimal unilateral policy and then
evaluates welfare from the standard national-income maximizing perspective, and these are the appropriate
choices for the purpose of his exercise. See also Deardor¤ and Stern (2008) for a survey on the estimates of
the e¤ects of removing barriers to service trade.
7For an example of prot-shifting through a unilateral barrier to entry, see Figure 5.3 of Deardor¤ and
Stern (2008).
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rms and destinations. In this setting, prohibitive policies are not optimal if governments
maximize national income, but governments will impose a prohibitive policy if they assign
an additional 50 percent weight on rm prots. We must still verify that such political
preferences do not also imply that barriers are jointly preferable to no barriers. We nd that
cooperation is desirable as long as political preferences are not considerably larger.
With a baseline model in place for which governments could agree to remove prohibitive
policies, we can then extend the model to consider how other market characteristics a¤ect in-
centives for noncooperation and cooperation. We can use these extensions to derive testable
predictions for when trade cooperation is feasible. The model allows for three possible out-
comes which would be realized as the governmentspolitical weight on rm prot increases:
(1) nonprohibitive policies under either noncooperation or cooperation, (2) prohibitive poli-
cies under noncooperation and free trade under cooperation, and (3) nonprohibitive policies
regardless of the level of cooperation. The model can then help us identify the relative like-
lihood of being in state (2) conditional on observing that we are in state (2) and (3), i.e.,
the relative likelihood of cooperation given that we are currently observing nonprohibitive
policies conditional on market characteristics. Such predictions can be of value since market
characteristics are likely to be more transparent and measurable than the parameters of an
individual governments objective function.8
The rst extension that we consider is symmetric trade costs. When trade costs are
higher, a lower tari¤ barrier is necessary to be prohibitive. Trade costs lower the cuto¤ of
the political economy parameter necessary to rationalize the imposition of prohibitive trade
barriers. The larger the trade cost, the narrower the parameter range for which cooperation
is feasible conditional on having observed prohibitive policies. Though trade costs make a
potential agreement less harmful to domestic prots, they make the agreement less appealing
both in terms of consumer welfare and export prots. The extension suggests why more
distant countries may have more di¢ culty achieving trade cooperation.
Next we consider asymmetry in the trade costs for each country, reecting possibly that
one nation may have better technology for exporting than another. For a su¢ ciently infe-
rior rm, cooperation is possible only for a smaller range of political economic parameters.
Though the nations with the inferior rms have a larger scope for gains in consumer welfare,
the increased competition for the inferior rms makes an agreement relatively less appealing
for most parameters. Meanwhile, the nation with the superior rm faces a larger benet
from an agreement in terms of exporting and less threat of foreign competition from the
8Ossa (2014) does indeed estimate such parameters, xed over his sample period, for a wide range of
industries and major trading governments. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) is the rst attempt to estimate the
parameters for the government objectives in Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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agreement.
A simple extension to consider beyond trade costs is mirror-image di¤erences in produc-
tivity with two countries and two imperfectly competitive industries. For small di¤erences in
productivity, the political economy necessary for a prohibitive tari¤ increases. In contrast,
a small di¤erence in productivity leads to little e¤ect on the di¤erence in payo¤s between
free trade and autarky, so a small di¤erence in productivity from the symmetric case leads
to less cooperation conditional on observing autarky. But for large enough di¤erences in
productivity, industry prots atten or even increase following liberalization. When prots
increase from liberalization, free trade is always preferable to autarky regardless of the polit-
ical economy parameter, and prohibitive unilateral policies are still possible, so cooperation
is more likely under such circumstances.
We then consider the level of competition in each country, parameterized by the number
of symmetric Cournot rms in each nation. We rst consider a symmetric increase in the
competition in each country. This narrows the range of the political economy parameter
for which cooperation is possible. When markets are already competitive, there are limited
pro-competitive gains from trade, so governments prefer to maintain protection relative to
the case when both nations have limited competition. The results generalize for n rms the
intuition from observing that cooperation is possible for national monopolies but impossible
for perfect competition. We also consider the potential for cooperation between a nation with
limited competition and a nation with high competition. In the limiting case as the number
of rms in the latter nation approaches innity, the potential for cooperation conditional on
observing noncooperative trade barriers approaches zero, so the impossibility of cooperation
is the same as in the perfectly competitive case.
Lastly, we consider the case of within-country rm heterogeneity in productivity among
symmetric countries. We focus on the simple yet rich case of asymmetry in productivity
among two rms in each country. With a small asymmetry, the results approach those from
competing duopolies, and with a large asymmetry, the results approach those from competing
monopolies. The interesting case of rm heterogeneity occurs when liberalization leads to
the contraction or exit of rms that are su¢ ciently competitive but not too competitive.
In this case, both consumer surplus and industry prots can increase upon cooperation,
so joint cooperation is always preferable to joint autarky regardless of political economy
considerations. And if industry prots decrease somewhat, very strong political economy
considerations are still necessary to rule out the possibility of cooperation. The results
suggest that industries with such an intermediate level of heterogeneity are suitable targets
for achieving cooperation.
To my knowledge this is the rst paper to present a class of models and parameters
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for which (1) prohibitive policies are unilaterally preferable relative to nonprohibitive poli-
cies and (2) nonprohibitive policies are jointly preferable to prohibitive policies. While the
prot-shifting externalities we consider are also the focus of a large literature of the 1980s
(surveyed in Brander, 1995), that literature focuses on static national-income maximizing
objectives, whereas the current paper nds that political economic preferences are necessary
for cooperation from noncooperative prohibitive policies. The initial literature to consider
political economic preferences (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Bagwell and Staiger,
1999) considers perfect competition, in which case there is no room for cooperation from
the prohibitive policies, so authors instead focus on settings for which unilaterally optimal
policies have interior solutions. The current paper focuses instead on the corner solutions,
and in that sense it has some similarity to the emphasis of Romer (1994) on the importance
of expanding trade in new goods versus trade in existing goods.
A more recent literature on imperfect competition in trade agreements begins with Ossa
(2011), but he does not consider agreements over prohibitive policies in his setting of CES
demand and no xed costs of exporting, there is no possibility of prohibitive trade policies.9
More recent literature on imperfect competition and trade agreements does not focus on
prohibitive import policies. One argument against the relevance of imperfect competition
externalities for trade agreements (from Bagwell and Staiger, 2012a, 2012b, 2015) is that
such externalities disappear when governments have both import and export policies, but
that argument depends on interior solutions for the noncooperative policies, so that argu-
ment cannot apply here.10 Such trade policy externalities would also cease to be relevant if
governments were to equate markups across sectors by using domestic subsidies, but empir-
ical evidence of interindustry markup heterogeneity refutes this possibility (see e.g. Epifani
and Gancia, 2011).11
Other authors aside from Bagwell and Staiger have considered trade agreements in the
context of Cournot competition. Mrazova (2011) is the rst to rationalize GATT principles
in a Cournot setting. Horn and Levinsohn (2001) consider nations choosing the number of
Cournot rms to model coordination over competition policy. Fiorini and Lebrand (2014)
9Bagwell and Lee (2015) consider trade policy in a setting with linear demand and heterogeneous rms.
Abel-Koch (2013) also considers prot-shifting in a heterogeneous rm setting, in which trade policies could
be prohibitive, though the focus is di¤erent from here.
10The results here, however, do not meet the Bagwell and Staiger (2010) criteria for deriving a "funda-
mental" trade agreement problem because like Ossa (2011) we only consider import tari¤s among the set of
trade policies. To meet their criteria would require us to prove that our results hold even if governments can
subsidize trade through import and export policies. Optimal joint policies would then involve subsidizing
trade, but it is not immediately obvious that we would fail to obtain similar qualitative results.
11We do not provide a microfoundation for why governments do not use such domestic subsidies, though
this is the case for almost all of the literature on trade policy under imperfect competition (see Bown,
Bagwell, and Staiger, 2014).
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consider agreements over a foreign direct investment (FDI) restriction on the number of
identical Cournot rms allowed to operate abroad in an intermediate good sector. The focus
of their results is on the existence of a commitment motive for FDI agreements and on how
the balance of domestic and foreign lobbying inuences whether an agreement is desirable
based on the standard measure of national welfare. The paper also relates to the ndings of
papers considering product standards in the presence of consumption externalities, such as
Fischer and Serra (2000) and Essaji (2010), but the focus is di¤erent from the current paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey presents the model and
then derives the parameter restrictions for the baseline case. Section 3 explores how various
market characteristics a¤ect the potential for trade cooperation. Section 4 then concludes
by discussing applications of the framework.
2 Model of Prohibitive Trade Policies
This section develops the simplest setting under which countries impose prohibitive trade
policies noncooperatively but nonetheless can benet from trade cooperation. The baseline
model is partial equilibrium with two countries, one rm in each country, and Cournot
competition with segmented markets. Governments maximize national income except they
assign to rm prots a political economy weight   1 following Baldwin (1987), and such
preferences can be derived from government preferences over national income and political
contributions, following Grossman and Helpman (1994). We call the nations Home and
Foreign, with asterisks (*) denoting foreign variables. Consumer demand is linear with
prices determined by P (Q) = 1   Q and P (Q) = 1   Q for aggregate domestic quantity
Q and foreign quantity Q. The home tari¤ is  and the foreign tari¤ is  , and we restrict
these to be nonnegative. The rm in each nation produces with constant marginal cost c
and trade cost . For the baseline model, we assume  = 0.
Using standard results and denitions from Cournot competition, we have the following
outcomes in the home market under autarky (the usual monopoly case), free trade (the usual
duopoly case), and a nonprohibitive tari¤.
8
Outcome n Policy Choice Autarky Free Trade Tari¤
Home domestic sales per rm qh 12(1  c) 13(1  c) 13(1  c+ )
Foreign exports per rm qf 0 13(1  c) 13(1  c  2)
Home exports per rm qh 0
1
3
(1  c) 1
3
(1  c  2 )
Market quantity Q 1
2
(1  c) 2
3
(1  c) 1
3
(2(1  c)  )
Market Price P 1
2
(1 + c) 1
3
(1 + 2c) 1
3
(1 + 2c+ )
Consumer Surplus CS 1
8
(1  c)2 2
9
(1  c)2 1
2

2(1 c) 
3
2
Prots (domestic sales) h 14(1  c)2 19(1  c)2
 
1 c+
3
2
Prots (sales abroad) f 0 19(1  c)2
 
1 c 2
3
2
Tari¤ revenue TR 0 0 
 
1 c 2
3

Government Objective G
 
1+2
8

(1  c)2  2+2
9

(1  c)2 (Given below)
Under standard national-income maximizing preferences with  = 1, duopoly yields the
payo¤ of 4
9
(1  c)2 which is preferable to 3
8
(1  c)2. So here we obtain a typical outcome of
trade under imperfect competition: pro-competitive gains from trade can result through the
reduction in markups.
Under more general political economic preferences with   1, the di¤erence between
the free trade payo¤ and the monopoly payo¤ is
2 + 2
9

(1  c)2  

1 + 2
8

(1  c)2 = 7  2a
72
(1  c)2,
so the governments strictly prefer free trade to autarky as long as  < 7
2
. If autarky is
the noncooperative outcome, then governments benet from a trade agreement under this
restriction on . Because tari¤s serve to contract joint production in the sector distorted by
imperfection competition and political economy, it is immediately clear that either autarky
or free trade is the optimal joint outcome depending on whether is  is above or below the
cuto¤. It then remains to be shown under what circumstances autarky is the noncooperative
outcome.
To dene the government objective as a function of the tari¤ , we must dene it piecewise
with a cuto¤ at the prohibitive tari¤ level. The tari¤ is prohibitive when 1
3
(1  c  2)  0,
i.e.   1
2
(1  c). The government objective as a function of the tari¤  is
G( ;) =
8<: 12

2(1 c) 
3
2
+ 
 
1 c+
3
2
+ f +
(1 c 2)
3
, if   1
2
(1  c), 
1+2
8

(1  c)2 + f , if   12(1  c).
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Observe that in this segmented market, partial equilibrium case, the prots abroad do not
depend on the home tari¤.
To derive the optimal unilateral policy, rst observe that
dG( ;)
d
= 

2  11
9

+

2+ 1
9

(1  c), if  < 1
2
(1  c).
Substituting the cuto¤  for the prohibitive tari¤ into the rst-order condition, we can
easily derive that for  < 3
2
, there is an optimal nonprohibitive tari¤ satisfying dG()
d
= 0
(the second-order condition is satised for  < 11
2
). For  2 [3
2
; 11
2
), dG()
d
> 0 for all
nonprohibitive tari¤s, and the optimal unilateral trade policy is prohibitive. So the optimal
unilateral policy satises
N() =
(  
2+1
11 2

(1  c), if  < 3
2
,
prohibitive if  2 [3
2
; 11
2
).
The following table summarizes the optimal unilateral policies and optimal joint policies
for the government.
 range Optimal unilateral policy Optimal joint policy
[1; 3
2
) Nonprohibitive tari¤ Free trade
[3
2
; 7
2
) Prohibitive trade policy Free trade
[7
2
; 11
2
) Prohibitive trade policy Prohibitive trade policies
The following proposition highlights the range of interest:
Proposition 1 For our baseline model, if governments assign a weight  2 [3
2
; 7
2
) to rm
prots, then the Nash equilibrium trade policies are prohibitive, free trade is globally optimal,
and governments can benet from a trade agreement.
We argue that political economy parameters in the range of interest are plausible based
on past empirical work. Ossa (2014) scales the political economy weight to average 1 across
industries, so we consider an estimate of 1.5 in his setting to be analogous to a weight of 1.5
in our partial equilibrium setting in which the industry under consideration is too small to
a¤ect factor markets. Ossa estimates parameters above 1.5 for Europe, Japan, and China
in both the wheat and rice industries. Moreover, all of the relevant  cuto¤s will decline to
more empirically relevant levels as we extend the model in the next section.
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3 How Market Characteristics A¤ect Cooperation
This section extends the model to illustrate how various market characteristics can af-
fect the potential for cooperation. The extensions we consider are symmetric trade costs,
asymmetric trade costs, mirror-image di¤erences in productivity for two industries, increases
in competition for symmetric nations, asymmetry in competition across nations, and rm
heterogeneity in productivity for symmetric nations. As detailed in the introduction, these
extensions can be useful to identify when cooperation is feasible starting from observing pro-
hibitive policies, assuming government preferences are static. We will characterize how the
extensions reect the probability of cooperation, based on whether the changes in parameters
expand or narrow the range of  for which cooperation is feasible.12
3.1 Trade Costs
We introduce symmetric trade costs  > 0 into the model. The autarky case is the same
as above, while free trade and tari¤s now have the following payo¤s
Outcome Free Trade (duopoly) Tari¤
Home domestic sales per rm qh 13(1  c+ ) 13(1  c+ + )
Foreign exports per rm qf 13(1  c  2) 13(1  c  2  2)
Home exports per rm qh
1
3
(1  c  2) 1
3
(1  c  2  2 )
Market quantity Q 1
3
(2(1  c)  ) 1
3
(2(1  c)    )
Market Price P 1
3
(1 + 2c+ ) 1
3
(1 + 2c+ + )
Consumer Surplus CS 1
2

2(1 c) 
3
2
1
2

2(1 c)  
3
2
Prots (domestic sales) h
 
1 c+
3
2  1 c++
3
2
Prots (sales abroad) f
 
1 c 2
3
2  1 c 2 2
3
2
Tari¤ revenue 0 (1 c 2 2
3
)
For the standard case for which  = 1, free trade is welfare improving when 
1 c <
5
22
, while for 
1 c 2 ( 522 ; 12) competition from trade is detrimental to welfare.13 We focus
throughout on the 
1 c 2 [0; 522) case.
More generally, the di¤erence between the free trade payo¤ and the monopoly payo¤ is
12The models prediction of whether cooperation is more or less likely would ultimately depend on our
prior for the distribution of , however.
13To see this, consider the di¤erence between the free trade payo¤ and the monopoly payo¤ when  = 1.
The resulting polynomial in the scaled trade cost, rescaled by 72(1 c)2 , is 5   32( 1 c ) + 44( 1 c )2 . The
polynomial is negative between the two roots of 522 and
1
2 .
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7  2a
72
(1  c)2  

2
9
+
2
9


(1  c)+

1
18
+
5
9


2, (1)
so free trade is preferable provided that
  7(1  c)
2   16(1  c)+ 42
2(1  c)2 + 16(1  c)  402 . (2)
It then remains to be shown under what circumstances autarky is the noncooperative out-
come.
We rst derive the government objective as a function of the tari¤  . Now the tari¤ is
prohibitive if   1
2
(1  c)  .
G( ;) =
(
1
2
 
2 2c  
3
2
+ 
 
1 c++
3
2
+ f +
(1 c 2 2)
3
, if   1
2
(1  c)  ., 
1+2
8

(1  c)2 + f , if   12(1  c)  .
The derivative for non-prohibitive tari¤ values is
dG()
d
= 

2  11
9

+

2  1
9

(1  c) + (2  5), if  < 1
2
(1  c)  .
Finally we derive the optimal unilateral policy conditional on 
N() =
(
(1+2)(1 c)+(2 5)
11 2 , if  <
3
2
  2
1 c ,
prohibitive if  2 [3
2
  2
1 c ;
11
2
).
So prohibitive policies are preferable when
  3
2
  2
1  c . (3)
Inequalities (2) and (3) are both uniquely satised with equality when 
1 c =
1
5
and  =
11
10
. When 
1 c 2 [0; 15 ], both equalities are satised for  2
h
7(1 c)2 16(1 c)+42
2(1 c)2+16(1 c) 402 ;
3
2
  2
1 c
i
.
As 
1 c increases from 0 to
1
5
, the range of  for which cooperation can remove prohibitive
policies strictly decreases from 2 to 0. We summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If we extend the baseline model to allow for symmetric trade costs satisfying

1 c <
1
5
, then there exists a range of  such that governments unilaterally impose prohibitive
policies and jointly prefer free trade. This range of  is strictly decreasing in the scaled trade
cost 
1 c .
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Figure 1: E¤ects of symmetric trade costs
We plot the relevant bounds on  as a function of the scaled trade cost 
1 c in Figure 1.
With trade costs, the lower bound of  for which prohibitive policies are unilaterally optimal
decreases to 11
10
from 3
2
. To the extent that a 11
10
parameter is more empirically plausible
than a 3
2
parameter, this nding improves the empirical relevance of the theory. In addition,
the exercise provides an explanation for why distant markets could have di¢ culty achieving
trade cooperation, because the range of cooperation over prohibitive policies is ultimately
eliminated as the trade costs increase.
To understand the economic intuition for why the range narrows, the key is the   2
9
+ 2
9


term in equation (1) representing the rst-order changes in payo¤s from an increase in trade
costs. The term is negative because the increase in trade costs leads to a reduction in export
prots and consumer surplus from an agreement. The trade cost increase also mitigates the
fall in domestic prots from an agreement, but this e¤ect is dominated. The agreement as a
whole is less appealing as trade costs increase, so the  upper bound in the gure sharply de-
creases. The lower bound also decreases but at slower rate. This decrease is the consequence
of a lower tari¤ being necessary to achieve prohibitive policies.
3.2 Asymmetric Trade Costs
Next we consider cross-country heterogeneity in trade costs. This could reect, for exam-
ple, that developed countries are better able to export than developing countries. Without
loss of generality, let h > f where h is the cost of Foreign supplying the Home market and
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f is the cost of Home supplying the Foreign market. Applying the results of the previous
subsection, we then have that the lower bound on  for prohibitive policies to be preferable
to nonprohibitive policies is
h  3
2
  2h
1  c (4)
for the Home government and
f  3
2
  2f
1  c (5)
for the Foreign government. The more export-procient Home government will enact pro-
hibitive policies for lower values of  because lower tari¤s are necessary to achieve prohibitive
policies.
The cuto¤s for mutual free trade to be preferable to autarky are somewhat more compli-
cated since they also depend on both Home and Foreign prots, which depend on di¤erent
trade costs in each country. The cuto¤ for Home is
h  7(1  c)
2   16(1  c)h + 42h
2(1  c)2   16(1  c)h + 32(1  c)f   82h   322f
; (6)
and the similar expression for Foreign is
f 
7(1  c)2   16(1  c)f + 42f
2(1  c)2   16(1  c)f + 32(1  c)h   82f   322h
. (7)
We plot the cuto¤s for h and f with h   f = :02 and the average scaled  on the
x-axis in Figure 2. As in the case of the symmetric trade costs, the government of the Foreign
rm with the higher exporting costs will prefer autarky to free trade for a lower range of
alpha because of the weaker export opportunities, even though trade with the more able
exporter provides a larger potential advantage in consumer surplus for the importing nation.
We summarize the results with the following proposition
Proposition 3 If we extend the baseline model to allow for asymmetric trade costs h > f
satisfying h
1 c <
1
5
, then the nation with the lower trade cost will be willing to liberalize from
prohibitive policies for a wider range of  than the nation with the higher trade cost.
3.3 Mirror-Image Di¤erences in Productivity
This section considers two nations and two industries with Cournot competition and
additively separable preferences, and a mirror-image asymmetry in productivity across the
two industries that is,each nation produces with cost c in the sector for which it is uniquely
14
Figure 2: E¤ects of asymmetric trade costs
more e¢ cient, and cost c +  in the other sector, for  2 (0; 1   c). In this setting, aside
from the pro-competitive gains from trade, there also exist Ricardian gains from trade.
Based on our baseline results, we can easily derive the value of either government objective
in autarky to be 
1 + 2
8

(1  c)2 +

1 + 2
8

(1  (c+  ))2
given that we have monopoly with cost c in one industry and c+  in the other.
The value of the objective under free trade takes a similar form to that of the trade-cost
case, with the cost di¤erence  playing a similar role as trade cost , as each market features
competition between rms with similar cost di¤erentials. The total payo¤ is twice that of
the trade-cost case, because there are two industries:

2(1  c)   
3
2
+ 
 
2

1  c+  
3
2
+ 2

1  c  2 
3
2!
In comparison to the trade cost case, the di¤erence between the free trade and autarky
payo¤s is twice the di¤erence in equation (1) (with  taking the role of ), except there
is an additional positive term (that enters negatively into the autarky payo¤) of (2(1  
c) )    2)  1+2
8

. This term reects additional Ricardian gains from trade from opening
the market with lower costs. The di¤erence between the two payo¤s ultimately evaluates to
15
7  2a
36
(1  c)2 +

2  7
36

(1  c) +

62  1
72

 2, (8)
and yields the following constraint on  for free trade to be preferable to autarky.
  14  14(
 
1 c)  (  1 c)2
4  4(  
1 c)  62(  1 c)2
. (9)
Observe that expressed as a function of the scaled productivity di¤erence  
1 c , the ratio
of polynomials is increasing in the argument. The numerator is strictly positive and the
denominator is decreasing over the relevant range, with a root at 3
p
7 1
31
 :224. When the
scaled productivity exceeds this value, free trade increases total industry prots, so there is
no value of  for which autarky would be preferable to free trade.
As for deriving the prohibitive tari¤s, rst observe that the larger  is necessary to
exclude the lower-cost imports rather than the higher-cost imports. The derivation of the
prohibitive tari¤ is the same as equation (3), with   substituting for . The lower bound
on  for prohibitive tari¤s is then
  3
2
+ 2(
 
1  c) (10)
Figure 3 summarizes the results. Notice that the range of feasible  for cooperation
removing prohibitive policies is initially shrinking (the derivative of the upper bound is 0
when the trade cost is 0), as a larger  is necessary for a prohibitive tari¤ as the productivity
di¤erence increases. This reects in part that consumer gains from trade are smaller when the
productivity di¤erences are larger in this setting. For large enough productivity di¤erences,
the necessary  to justify cooperative prohibitive tari¤s expands as the decrease in total
industry prots from free trade disappears.
We summarize the results with the following proposition
Proposition 4 If we extend the baseline model to allow for two industries with mirror-image
costs of c and c +  ;asymmetric trade costs such that  
1 c < 1, then for small di¤erences in
productivity, cooperation is likely for a narrower range of  given that prohibitive tari¤s are
observed, but for larger di¤erences in productivity, cooperation is possible for a wider range
of .
3.4 Competition
The next extension we consider is multiple homogeneous rms in each nation. Increasing
the number of symmetric Cournot rms is a reasonable way to model the level of competition
16
Figure 3: E¤ect of mirror-image di¤erences in productivity
in each nation this is done in the international competition policy study of Horn and
Levinsohn (2001). Let n be the number of Home rms and n be the number of Foreign
rms. The table gives values of various economic quantities under Cournot competition,
with some elements of the tari¤ column dened from previous rows for the sake of brevity.
Outcome n Policy Choice Autarky Free Trade Tari¤
Home domestic sales per rm qh
(1 c)
n+1
1 c
n+n+1
(1 c+n)
n+n+1
Foreign exports per rm qf 0 1 cn+n+1
(1 c (1+n))
n+n+1
Home exports per rm qh 0
1 c
n+n+1
(1 c (1+n))
n+n+1
Market quantity Q n(1 c)
n+1
(n+n)(1 c)
n+n+1
((n+n)(1 c) n)
n+n+1
Market Price P (1+nc)
n+1
(1+(n+n)c)
n+n+1
(1+(n+n)c+n)
n+n+1
Consumer Surplus CS n
2(1 c)2
2(n+1)2
(n+n)2(1 c)2
2(n+n+1)2
1
2
Q2
Prots (domestic sales) h
(1 c)2
(n+1)2
(1 c)2
(n+n+1)2 (P   c)nqh
Prots (sales abroad) f 0
(1 c)2
(n+n+1)2 (P   c)nqh
Tari¤ revenue TR 0 0 nqf
Government Objective G

n2+2n
2(n+1)2

(1  c)2 ((n+n)2+4n)(1 c)2
2(n+n+1)2 (omitted)
We consider the case of symmetric rms in each country such that n = n. First consider
the cuto¤  for which free trade is preferable to autarky. We nd that
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Figure 4: E¤ects of intranational competition
a  1 + 3n+ 2
4n2   2 .
To solve for the lower  bound at which point prohibitive policies are preferable to
nonprohibitive tari¤s, notice rst the prohibitive tari¤ is  = 1 c
1+n
. The Nash equilibrium
tari¤ equals the prohibitive level when
2n+ 1
2(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)  n(1 + 2n)

(1  c)  1  c
n+ 1
,
which then simplies to the relevant cuto¤ of
  1 + 1
2n
.
We then plot the cuto¤s as a function of n in Figure 4. Notice as with trade costs, as
n goes to innity and competition increases in both markets, the range of parameter values
for which cooperation can remove prohibitive policies then narrows. The potential pro-
competitive gains are smaller as competition increases, so the agreement becomes relatively
less appealing for a given value of . In the extreme case we get that there is no potential
for cooperation given the observation of prohibitive trade policies this result is expected,
since Cournot competition approaches perfect competition as n approaches innity, and we
know there is no possibility of cooperation under perfect competition.
18
Perhaps what is a more surprising result is that cooperation could be more feasible for
protected monopolies with large political power than duopolies with less political power.
Contrast e.g. n = 1 and  = 2:5 for which cooperation is feasible with n > 1 and  = 2.
Cooperation is more desirable under the protected monopolies because the pro-competitive
gains from trade are so large.
For an additional result, we consider a country with a small number of rms forming a
trade agreement with a country with a large amount of competition. In the limiting case as
n approaches innity, both the upper and lower bound on  for Home equal 1+ 1
2n
, equal to
the lower bound in the above gure. So for a government with a protected monopolist, there
is no room for cooperation with a fully competitive trading partner if we currently observe
prohibitive trade policies.
We summarize the results here.
Proposition 5 Suppose we extend the baseline model to allow for n identical rms in Home
and n rms in Foreign. As n and n increase symmetrically, there is a narrower parameter
range of  for which cooperation is jointly preferable and prohibitive policies are unilaterally
preferable. If the number of rms in either nation approaches innity, then there is no
potential for cooperation starting from prohibitive policies.
3.5 Firm Heterogeneity
The nal extension that we consider is rm heterogeneity. We consider a simple kind of
heterogeneity two rms with di¤erent productivities in each nation but the model is still
rich in implications. We index the rms in each country as 1 and 2 with costs c1 and c2.
Without loss of generality we assume c1  c2. The outcomes for each rm are given below
with cj representing the cost of the other rm. We omit the consumer surplus calculations
for brevity.
Outcome n Policy Choice Autarky Free Trade Tari¤
Home domestic sales per rm qih
1 2ci+cj
3
1 3ci+2cj
5
1 3ci+2cj+2
5
Foreign exports per rm qif 0
1 3ci+2cj
5
1 3ci+2cj 3
5
Home exports per rm qih 0
1 3ci+2cj
5
1 3ci+2cj 3
5
Market quantity Q 2 2c1 2c2
3
4 3c1 3c2
5
4 3c1 3c2 3
5
Market Price P (1+c1+c2)
3
1+2c1+2c2
5
1+2c1+2c2+2
5
To capture simply the rm heterogeneity, we dene the parameter !  1 c1
1 c2 which is the
ratio of the rst-best per-market production level of each rm if it were the sole producer.
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We focus on the !  1 case without loss of generality. Notice that for both rms to be
producing in autarky, we require that ! < 2, and for both rms to be producing under free
trade, we require that ! < 3
2
.
We derive the  parameter cuto¤ for mutual free trade to be preferable to autarky.
Notice that when ! = 1 we have the same result as the symmetric two-rm case from the
previous subsection, for which the cuto¤ is 11
7
. As ! increases from 1, the cuto¤ initially
increases. Then in the range between !  116 15
p
7
109
 1:43 and 5
3
, liberalization increases
industry prots and free trade is preferable to autarky regardless of . For ! 2 (5
3
; 2), the
cuto¤ declines as ! increases. For ! = 2, the inferior rms are no longer active in autarky,
so the model reduces back to the baseline model, for which the cuto¤  is 7
2
. The complete
cuto¤  results are as follows.
1. For ! 2 [1; !),   11(1+!)2 2(109!2 232!+109!2) .
2. For ! 2 [!; 5
3
], free trade is always jointly preferable to autarky.
3. For ! 2 (5
3
; 2],   3!2 2! 1
6!2 16!+10 .
Next we derive the cuto¤values of  for which a unilateral prohibitive policy is preferable
to a unilateral tari¤. We rst consider that for some values of , nations may prefer a tari¤
that is prohibitive for only the trading partners inferior rm. For the region when both
rms are active, we nd that the optimal tari¤ would be
N  (4+ 1)(2  c1   c2)
(56  16) ,
and the tari¤ level that is prohibitive for the inferior rm is  = 1+2c1 3c2
3
. Solving for the
cuto¤ ,
  10 + 23c1   33c2
4(2 + c1   3c2) =
33  23!
4(3  !) .
When c1 = c2, this reduces to   54 which is consistent with the cuto¤ result for the n = 2
case from the previous homogeneous-rm subsection. When !  21
19
, nations always prefer a
tari¤ that prohibits the inferior rm from exporting.
As in the baseline monopoly case, the prohibitive tari¤ for both of the trading partners
rms is preferable when   3
2
:
20
Figure 5: E¤ects of rm heterogeneity
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Figure 5.summarizes all the results.14 To interpret the gure, rst observe that when the
two rms are homogeneous, there is a narrow range of parameter values (3
2
; 11
7
) for which
cooperation would be feasible given that noncooperative policies are currently observed. But
as the productivity di¤erence between the rms increases, the parameter ranges for which
cooperation is possible increases dramatically, and cooperation is possible for all   3
2
provided that ! 2 [!; 5
3
]. The intuition is that when rms are su¢ ciently heterogeneous,
industry prots within each nation can grow. For other parameter ranges, prots fall by a
smaller amount than in the homogenous rm case. As ! increases beyond 5
3
, liberalization
decreases prots relative to autarky this is because when the inferior domestic rm is pro-
viding su¢ ciently low competition for the superior rm in autarky, industry prots decrease
again once each de facto monopoly is exposed to trade. But still the parameter ranges for
which liberalization is feasible conditional on observing autarky is much wider than when !
is close to 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose we extend the baseline model to allow for two rms in each country
with asymmetric costs, and we maintain cross-country symmetry. As the rm heterogeneity
increases, the parameter range of  for which cooperation is feasible initially expands and
then contracts.
4 Conclusion
The rst contribution of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible starting from
prohibitive policies, even if government preferences do not change. This is a nontrivial
result, because such cooperation with static government preferences is impossible under
perfect competition. We then extend a baseline model to determine under which market
characteristics cooperation from prohibitive policies is likely to be feasible. We nd that
cooperation is more likely to be feasible for lower levels of trade costs, weaker levels of
intranational competition, and intermediate ranges of rm heterogeneity.
Like any theoretical study, the results here motivate checks of empirical validity and theo-
retical robustness. Strategic trade models are infamous for lack of robustness for the mode of
competition (Brander, 1995). This common critique of strategic trade models is focused on
optimal unilateral export policies, however. There is no clear reason in the existing literature
to believe that the prot-shifting e¤ects of prohibitive trade policies would be as sensitive
14For simplicity, we do not subdivide the nonprohibitive policies portion based on whether policies are
prohibitive for the inferior rm. The cuto¤ would run from  = 54 at ! = 1, to  = 1 at ! =
21
19 , cutting
the lower-left corner of the gure. For  or ! above this cuto¤, trade policies are prohibitive for the inferior
rms
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to assumptions about market structure. Still the consideration of such robustness would be
worthwhile for future work. Another important check would be to consider prohibitive poli-
cies resulting from xed costs of exporting rather than a choke price in linear demand. As
for empirical validity, it would be valuable to test the models predictions among prohibitive
barriers that have later been removed. Ideally, the model could be useful in guiding future
e¤orts in trade cooperation.
The paper concludes with brief arguments for the relevance of these results for WTO
negotiations involving developing countries and services trade. Much of the frontier in these
respective areas is surveyed by Bagwell and Staiger (2014) for development and Francois and
Hoekman (2010) for services trade.
For the case of services trade, Francois and Hoekman (2010) remark,
We need to deepen our understanding of why trade agreements have attracted
less attention and support by rms than has been the case when it comes to trade
in goods. A rst step here is to improve our understanding of the problem(s) that
trade agreements spanning services are meant to solve. It is not clear that for
international transactions that involve factor movement (i.e., trade in services)
the standard explanations in the literature rst and foremost the terms of trade
rationale necessarily apply.... Given that in services market access and regu-
lation are closely intertwined, in many markets the key need may be to reform
regulatory policies that impede contestability.
This comment ties well into the focus of the current paper. Indeed, we nd the best
potential opportunity for successful cooperation from current prohibitive policies is between
state monopolies, even if these monopolies are more politically powerful than protected
industries with more domestic competition. Though services trade often involves behind-
the-border measures rather than tari¤s, the current paper is still relevant in explaining why
nations would impose prohibitions rather than, say, licensing fees that discriminate against
foreigners.15
Much of the focus in Bagwell and Staiger (2014) is on the failure of developing countries
to engage in reciprocal tari¤ reductions, the limits of gains on MFN free-riding, and the
"latecomers problem" that exists when developed countries have achieved their politically
optimal tari¤s and have no desire for further liberalization with developing nations. A
di¤erent perspective is provided by Lamp (2014) who describes the history of GATT e¤orts
to determine barriers to trade for developing countries in areas where little trade exists, as
well as the struggles of developing countries to enter negotiations in industries for which
15See Feketekuty (2008) for background on the history of services negotiations.
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they were not principal suppliers. For the kind of trade agreement problems described in the
current paper, the principal of reciprocity as it has been practiced in the GATT and WTO
would not so neatly apply. Though the current paper contributes by identifying market
characteristics for which cooperation from prohibitive policies is likely to be feasible, further
would work would be necessary to understand what institutional designs can aid in guiding
nations from the noncooperative to the cooperative outcome.
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